MASS MIGRATION AND REVERSING THE POLARITY OF MORALITY

by Duns Scotus

On a certain level morality is merely rationalization for what you want to do anyway. If you’re into paedophilia then, of course, you are suddenly intrigued by the issues and science surrounding infant intelligence and volition, as well as religious systems that seem more accommodating to it. If fucking sheep is your thing, you may wish to point out the “plausible idea” that killing them is already morally acceptable, so why not something they might even enjoy? If rent boys float your boat – and you want them cheap and keen – then you may be inclined to see the “moral utility” of ensuring that the migrant boats to Europe keep floating.

But morality is rationalization only on a certain level, because there is actually an absolute level where morality is connected to absolutes, and where there is no justification at all for fiddling with three-year olds, fucking sheep, or buggering doe-eyed bacha boys. Unfortunately, this absolute level requires much more intellectual rigour than most people are capable of, so morality is effectively an emotional dimension.

DEGENERATE MORALITY

                     

by William Solniger

Anyone who has seriously tried to practise any sort of virtue, however meagre, will know the necessity of making a habit of it – not just “knowing” it theoretically, but engraving it into his very being by constant repetition, so that he becomes what he repeatedly does. Because of this necessity for constant repetition, virtue cannot be left to the “important things” alone, but must permeate the insignificant and trivial ones as well. This is why the Hagakure contains the advice that “small matters should be taken seriously”; and this is perhaps also the reason behind the more arbitrary and petty aspects of religious and traditional codes.

In any case, it is a concept sorely neglected in the present day, as relativism provides the ultimate excuse to force all forms of virtue to bend and flex in the wind of particular circumstances and situations. But someone who cannot practise virtue inflexibly and habitually is very rarely able to practise it at all. Contrary to the belief of almost all of our contemporaries, someone who is accustomed to telling thousands of gentle lies and half-truths in everyday life cannot simply put down his habit of dishonesty to think about “important things” like life, the world, and himself; and this is similar to the truth that, despite much fantasising to the contrary, someone who is accustomed to avoiding confrontation in small matters of honour will rarely be able to draw his courage from its rusty scabbard on an occasion when he really needs it.