by Colin Liddell
Libya is in the news right now, with reports that the Benghazi-based Libyan National Army (LNA) is advancing on the capital Tripoli, where a UN-backed "government" has been inefficiently ruling over parts of the East of the country for the last few years.
The best thing that can happen to Libya is the restoration of strong government by someone—indeed anyone. The chaos that followed the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 has added greatly to the refugee invasion of Europe, with NGOs and European navies using the so-called "humanitarian crisis" to justify serving as a free ferry service for millions of Third World migrants.
With a strong government in place, it can be expected that the flow of migrants from the shores of Africa will be more easily curtailed, although ultimately that depends on the attitudes of the European governments themselves and how much the globalising influence of the EU can be held in check.
But just who are the LNA and what do we know about its leader Khalifa Haftar, who is now being touted at a potential "military strongman" figure who could reunite the country?
First of all, the guy is pretty old, around 76 years old, and has had some serious health issues. He also has a long history in Libyan politics, going all the way back to the Gaddafi-led coup in 1969, when Haftar was one of the military officers who helped Gaddafi seize the country in a Nasserite coup.
He was a close associate of the Libyan leader until the 1980s, when he was put in charge of the Libyan forces intervening in the civil war in neighbouring Chad.
When he was defeated and captured by the French-backed Chadians, Haftar became an exile and opponent of Gaddafi, either because he was "turned" by Western security forces or because he felt betrayed by Gaddafi who used him as a scapegoat for failure.
He then spent several years in the U.S.
The fact that he was based close to the CIA's headquarters in Langley was not a coincidence, and it appears that he became a U.S. asset, which would also explain why he was parachuted into a leadership role in the 2011 uprising.
Following the defeat of Gaddafi, Libya went through a period of chaos, with two power centres emerging—Tripoli in the West and Benghazi in the East, where Haftar was located.
Benghazi was more under threat by Islamists and closer to the country's oil wells, leading to a more complex geopolitical dynamic, involving the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others. Tripoli by contrast became the centre of a more NGO-driven, aid-as-welfare dynamic, with a corrupt and inefficient government gaining support from the UN and the EU in order to milk the "gibs."
This also set the scene for the present crisis.
While the Benghazi clique gained strength, organisation, and military support from fighting so-called "bad" Islamists like ISIS—while also incorporating US-and-Saudi-approved "good" Islamists (i.e. Salafists)—the Tripoli clique rested on its laurels. Significantly it was unable to fully control its half of the country, with the disorganised distribution of aid rather exacerbating divisions.
Before the big drive on Tripoli by the LNA, Haftar was reportedly in Saudi Arabia, where he appears to have got the blessing of King Salman for his actions. This means that he is also probably supported by Israel, Egypt, and various Gulf States, and, at least covertly, by the United States.
But what about the government in Tripoli? This is supposed to be the internationally recognized government. However, even among its EU backers, there are said to be divisions, with the French supposedly onside with Haftar, while the Italians back Tripoli. Indeed, in order to free up forces for the push on Tripoli, the French reportedly bombed the Chadian groups that the LNA had also been fighting in the South of the country.
Both of the factions are trying to use the hope of ending the flow of refugees as political capital to gain international support. While the Tripoli government has clearly failed to do much to halt the flow, it is not clear if Haftar would be any better. Indeed, along with the oil, which is being ruthlessly exploited without consideration for the interests of the Libyan people, the aid attracted by Libya's ongoing humanitarian crisis is a massive cash-cow for the gangs, militias, and factions in Libya.
The fact that Western aid is being deployed also means that half-baked moves to "democratise" Libya are also required. In a country that is clearly not ready for them, this feeds into the endless cycle of destabilisation, factionalism, civil war, and chaos. Haftar has extremely suspicious credentials, but if he can break these cycles, then he may just be a step in the right direction.
However, the main point to bear in mind is that European countries have been unwittingly destabilising Libya by (a) accepting the migrant flow and (b) giving aid.
If Europe closed the sea lanes completely tomorrow and cut off all humanitarian aid, Libya would transform itself into an orderly and somewhat efficient oil exporting country almost overnight.
Become a Patron!
Libya is in the news right now, with reports that the Benghazi-based Libyan National Army (LNA) is advancing on the capital Tripoli, where a UN-backed "government" has been inefficiently ruling over parts of the East of the country for the last few years.
The best thing that can happen to Libya is the restoration of strong government by someone—indeed anyone. The chaos that followed the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 has added greatly to the refugee invasion of Europe, with NGOs and European navies using the so-called "humanitarian crisis" to justify serving as a free ferry service for millions of Third World migrants.
With a strong government in place, it can be expected that the flow of migrants from the shores of Africa will be more easily curtailed, although ultimately that depends on the attitudes of the European governments themselves and how much the globalising influence of the EU can be held in check.
But just who are the LNA and what do we know about its leader Khalifa Haftar, who is now being touted at a potential "military strongman" figure who could reunite the country?
What is he Haftar? |
He was a close associate of the Libyan leader until the 1980s, when he was put in charge of the Libyan forces intervening in the civil war in neighbouring Chad.
When he was defeated and captured by the French-backed Chadians, Haftar became an exile and opponent of Gaddafi, either because he was "turned" by Western security forces or because he felt betrayed by Gaddafi who used him as a scapegoat for failure.
He then spent several years in the U.S.
The fact that he was based close to the CIA's headquarters in Langley was not a coincidence, and it appears that he became a U.S. asset, which would also explain why he was parachuted into a leadership role in the 2011 uprising.
Following the defeat of Gaddafi, Libya went through a period of chaos, with two power centres emerging—Tripoli in the West and Benghazi in the East, where Haftar was located.
Benghazi was more under threat by Islamists and closer to the country's oil wells, leading to a more complex geopolitical dynamic, involving the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others. Tripoli by contrast became the centre of a more NGO-driven, aid-as-welfare dynamic, with a corrupt and inefficient government gaining support from the UN and the EU in order to milk the "gibs."
This also set the scene for the present crisis.
While the Benghazi clique gained strength, organisation, and military support from fighting so-called "bad" Islamists like ISIS—while also incorporating US-and-Saudi-approved "good" Islamists (i.e. Salafists)—the Tripoli clique rested on its laurels. Significantly it was unable to fully control its half of the country, with the disorganised distribution of aid rather exacerbating divisions.
Before the big drive on Tripoli by the LNA, Haftar was reportedly in Saudi Arabia, where he appears to have got the blessing of King Salman for his actions. This means that he is also probably supported by Israel, Egypt, and various Gulf States, and, at least covertly, by the United States.
Tripoli under attack |
Both of the factions are trying to use the hope of ending the flow of refugees as political capital to gain international support. While the Tripoli government has clearly failed to do much to halt the flow, it is not clear if Haftar would be any better. Indeed, along with the oil, which is being ruthlessly exploited without consideration for the interests of the Libyan people, the aid attracted by Libya's ongoing humanitarian crisis is a massive cash-cow for the gangs, militias, and factions in Libya.
The fact that Western aid is being deployed also means that half-baked moves to "democratise" Libya are also required. In a country that is clearly not ready for them, this feeds into the endless cycle of destabilisation, factionalism, civil war, and chaos. Haftar has extremely suspicious credentials, but if he can break these cycles, then he may just be a step in the right direction.
However, the main point to bear in mind is that European countries have been unwittingly destabilising Libya by (a) accepting the migrant flow and (b) giving aid.
If Europe closed the sea lanes completely tomorrow and cut off all humanitarian aid, Libya would transform itself into an orderly and somewhat efficient oil exporting country almost overnight.
Become a Patron!