Pete Buttigieg’s rise and fall was so fast and brief that he’s no longer topical. Last month he was the Democratic party flavor of the month, appearing on TV constantly and written about in all the important online properties. Now, he is back to obscurity.
Buttigieg’s rise and fall is interesting when you compare and contrast him with another Democratic politician with a flash-in-the-pan run for President: former Vermont Governor Howard Dean.
In 2004, Howard Dean emerged as a serious contender to take on incumbent Republican George W. Bush. Unlike the rest of the Democratic candidates, Howard Dean was willing to “go there” in the “9/11 era.” Not only was Dean taking Bush head on over the increasingly unpopular Iraq war and openly calling out the Bush administration for their lies about “Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction,” Dean even occasionally made dark hints about Bush administration “advanced warnings” of the 9/11 attacks and criticized the administration’s record on “anti-terrorism” both before and after 9/11.
Policy wise, Dean was part of the Carter/Clinton “neo-liberal,” anti-labor faction of the Democratic party. Dean wanted “smart regulation” of business, didn’t want higher taxes on private industry, and was a fanatical free-trader in the Al Gore tradition. But he nevertheless emerged as the leader of the “liberal” wing of the Democratic party. Mostly, this was simply because he was willing to attack Republicans where they seemed to be strong, “national security,” instead of what most Democrats were doing, playing a “me too” cheerleading role in the Bush “War On Terrorism.”
Dean’s campaign also straddled the line between old-time retail Democratic party politics and the emerging communication structure of the internet. Dean was one of the first to engage in mass online fund-raising, raising money from a very large number of potential voters in comparatively small amounts. Along with this, his campaign built mailing lists and data-mining operations to understand how to effectively market to potential voting blocks.
At its weakest point, after lukewarm showings in early contests like Iowa but before they could compete in more favorable areas, larger states like California and White Democratic strongholds like Wisconsin, the national media coordinated the take-down of Howard Dean’s campaign. A video of Dean speaking at a rally had its audio doctored to make Dean sound like an unhinged lunatic, and the entire media, from the official news outlets to the liberal, Democratic partisans of the “late night comedy shows” spent the next month making jokes about “the Dean Scream” and the campaign closed shortly thereafter. The Democratic primary would be won by Senator John Kerry who would go on to gracefully lose to Bush, even though opposition to the Bush administration was so strong it’s almost certain the Bush administration engaged in election fraud to pad the margins.
What came out after Dean’s loss was an acknowledgement about the “astroturf” nature of his campaign. Dean’s support did not come from the voters of Vermont, or Vermont institutions. Not only was Dean not a localist, he wasn’t even from Vermont, merely a carpet-bagger from New York like his fellow Vermont politician Bernie Sanders.
If it wasn’t Vermonsters supporting Dean, who was it?
Although it was rarely discussed, in the 1990s Howard Dean had become popular among “the LGBT Community” because of his pro-“gay marriage” stance in Vermont, long before the issue was embraced by Democrats like Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. His massive online fundraising wasn’t, at the core, an expression of anti-Bush sentiment among “liberals” in the Democratic party, but a pre-organized network of LGBT fundraisers and organizations. This all happened under the radar and was never an open part of Dean’s campaign, nor was it explained until after the end of the campaign that this was, in fact, a massive win for the LGBT community, who had officially joined the ranks of the Democratic party insiders, a proven faction that could raise a massive amount of money, effectively organize “social media” for political ends, and run behind the scenes data mining and marketing operations. After his defeat, Dean’s campaign team would take over the actual Democratic party and begin building the coalition that would bring Barack Obama to power four years later.
And, they could do it without drawing unwanted attention to themselves.
Similarly to Jews, LGBTs can be seen as a “tribe.” The political and social expression of the Jewish “tribe” includes many people who are not Jewish, ethnically nor religiously, but nevertheless have some ties and perceived common interests with the tribe. Similarly, there are plenty of people in the LGBT tribe that are not actually lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender, but nevertheless have ties and perceived common interests with the LGBT tribe. (Contrast a “tribe” with a “local community.”)
Since the 2000s, similar “LGBT tribes” have been organized in many other countries and during the Obama administration, leveraging these “LGBT tribes” in other countries became an official policy of USA imperialism; in both the Russian orbit and the Muslim world, “LGBT-ish” networks were used as “fifth columns” to generate unrest in nations that were targets for “regime change.” “Fighting homophobia” in other people’s countries became official US policy much as “fighting anti-semitism” has been since the end of World War II. The current administration of Donald Trump has embraced both agendas as centerpieces of its foreign policy.
LGBTs, like Jews, often engage in a sort of “crypsis” called “the closet” where their membership is more or less hidden, although a huge difference between these two semi-clandestine social networks is that the Jewish tribe is biologically foreign to Americans; to the degree Ashkenazis are intermarried to and assimilated among Whites they are correspondingly less “Jewish.” LGBTs, both the actual homosexuals as well as the fellow-travellers, are domestic; in fact the “LGBT movement” itself is overwhelming racially white and even the overrepresentation of Jews among their leadership and organizations corresponds to Jewish overrepresentation in American institutions generally.
Now, Dean’s “50 state strategy” makes sense: while the old Democratic party establishment wanted to write off states where Democrats weren’t likely to win, Dean’s team wanted to organize, and fundraise, in deep “red” areas. This mirrors the later official imperalist policy: to organize these semi-clandestine “LGBT networks” even “behind enemy lines.”
It’s important to point out that neither the Jewish network that engages in “crypsis” nor the LGBT network that engages in “the closet” are responsible for the decline of American localism; their value is as an illustration of the types of networks in opposition to localism which became empowered by the collapse of localism. The death of American localism is almost entirely due to technological changes. The first and most obvious technological development that destroyed localism was the automobile.
Car culture encourages mobility, travel and even uprooting one’s family from their locality of birth and settling into another city or even state. The second most obvious technological development that spelled the death knell of American localism was mass electronic media, a development whose influence cannot be overstated.
Whatever social influence local institutions had were dwarfed in an instant by the mass electronic media. In the earliest days of electronic mass media the local broadcast stations were cartelized and controlled centrally. Even in the early days radio stations more often than not favored centralized programming of both news and entertainment instead of broadcasting the local community theater or orchestra. Especially by the time of television, the social influence of national news and nationally syndicated entertainment completely overpowered the influence of local community institutions and even the nuclear and extended family.
Mass electronic media advertising even broke localism at the family level; early radio ads would often target children, specifically, or a husband or a wife, specifically, instead of advertising to the whole family. This sort of “segmentation” of the market was itself a blow against the organic locality. Now, young Billy had more in common with his fellow schoolboy on the other side of the country than he did with his family, or an elder at his church, or a teacher at his school. Now, wife Jill was not “Mrs. John Smith” the Matriarch of the Smith Clan, but a member of the marketing segment “women.”
Howard Dean’s semi-clandestine “LGBT network,” just like the semi-clandestine “liberal Zionist” network in the Democratic party (Haim Saban) and the semi-clandestine “neo-conservative” network in the Republican party (Sheldon Adelson) has similarities with the old British Empire’s “Rhodes Scholarship” network that helped launch the career of former President Bill Clinton. In all of these cases, a “local” person becomes a leader, not due to support from the local community, but because they have been recruited by a larger network.
Dean’s main benefactors were not people from Vermont, nor even gays and lesbians in Vermont, but instead the nation-wide (perhaps even international) emerging “LGBT” tribe. A Jew like Bernie Sanders and a Goy like Lindsey Graham are not, fundamentally, representatives of the people of Vermont and South Carolina, but products of semi-clandestine Zionist fundraising, media and organizing networks. Bill Clinton did not win the Presidency based on his performance as Governor of Arkansas, but because his career was managed by the Anglo-American department of the old British Rhodes Scholarship network.
Even before the era of cheap, motorized transportation, and significantly before the invention of mass electronic media, such semi-clandestine networks existed in opposition to localism and, just like our present day, engendered a reaction, both localist and non-localist.
Also published at Aryan Skynet
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Buttigieg’s rise and fall is interesting when you compare and contrast him with another Democratic politician with a flash-in-the-pan run for President: former Vermont Governor Howard Dean.
In 2004, Howard Dean emerged as a serious contender to take on incumbent Republican George W. Bush. Unlike the rest of the Democratic candidates, Howard Dean was willing to “go there” in the “9/11 era.” Not only was Dean taking Bush head on over the increasingly unpopular Iraq war and openly calling out the Bush administration for their lies about “Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction,” Dean even occasionally made dark hints about Bush administration “advanced warnings” of the 9/11 attacks and criticized the administration’s record on “anti-terrorism” both before and after 9/11.
Policy wise, Dean was part of the Carter/Clinton “neo-liberal,” anti-labor faction of the Democratic party. Dean wanted “smart regulation” of business, didn’t want higher taxes on private industry, and was a fanatical free-trader in the Al Gore tradition. But he nevertheless emerged as the leader of the “liberal” wing of the Democratic party. Mostly, this was simply because he was willing to attack Republicans where they seemed to be strong, “national security,” instead of what most Democrats were doing, playing a “me too” cheerleading role in the Bush “War On Terrorism.”
Dean’s campaign also straddled the line between old-time retail Democratic party politics and the emerging communication structure of the internet. Dean was one of the first to engage in mass online fund-raising, raising money from a very large number of potential voters in comparatively small amounts. Along with this, his campaign built mailing lists and data-mining operations to understand how to effectively market to potential voting blocks.
At its weakest point, after lukewarm showings in early contests like Iowa but before they could compete in more favorable areas, larger states like California and White Democratic strongholds like Wisconsin, the national media coordinated the take-down of Howard Dean’s campaign. A video of Dean speaking at a rally had its audio doctored to make Dean sound like an unhinged lunatic, and the entire media, from the official news outlets to the liberal, Democratic partisans of the “late night comedy shows” spent the next month making jokes about “the Dean Scream” and the campaign closed shortly thereafter. The Democratic primary would be won by Senator John Kerry who would go on to gracefully lose to Bush, even though opposition to the Bush administration was so strong it’s almost certain the Bush administration engaged in election fraud to pad the margins.
What came out after Dean’s loss was an acknowledgement about the “astroturf” nature of his campaign. Dean’s support did not come from the voters of Vermont, or Vermont institutions. Not only was Dean not a localist, he wasn’t even from Vermont, merely a carpet-bagger from New York like his fellow Vermont politician Bernie Sanders.
If it wasn’t Vermonsters supporting Dean, who was it?
Although it was rarely discussed, in the 1990s Howard Dean had become popular among “the LGBT Community” because of his pro-“gay marriage” stance in Vermont, long before the issue was embraced by Democrats like Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. His massive online fundraising wasn’t, at the core, an expression of anti-Bush sentiment among “liberals” in the Democratic party, but a pre-organized network of LGBT fundraisers and organizations. This all happened under the radar and was never an open part of Dean’s campaign, nor was it explained until after the end of the campaign that this was, in fact, a massive win for the LGBT community, who had officially joined the ranks of the Democratic party insiders, a proven faction that could raise a massive amount of money, effectively organize “social media” for political ends, and run behind the scenes data mining and marketing operations. After his defeat, Dean’s campaign team would take over the actual Democratic party and begin building the coalition that would bring Barack Obama to power four years later.
And, they could do it without drawing unwanted attention to themselves.
Similarly to Jews, LGBTs can be seen as a “tribe.” The political and social expression of the Jewish “tribe” includes many people who are not Jewish, ethnically nor religiously, but nevertheless have some ties and perceived common interests with the tribe. Similarly, there are plenty of people in the LGBT tribe that are not actually lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender, but nevertheless have ties and perceived common interests with the LGBT tribe. (Contrast a “tribe” with a “local community.”)
Since the 2000s, similar “LGBT tribes” have been organized in many other countries and during the Obama administration, leveraging these “LGBT tribes” in other countries became an official policy of USA imperialism; in both the Russian orbit and the Muslim world, “LGBT-ish” networks were used as “fifth columns” to generate unrest in nations that were targets for “regime change.” “Fighting homophobia” in other people’s countries became official US policy much as “fighting anti-semitism” has been since the end of World War II. The current administration of Donald Trump has embraced both agendas as centerpieces of its foreign policy.
LGBTs, like Jews, often engage in a sort of “crypsis” called “the closet” where their membership is more or less hidden, although a huge difference between these two semi-clandestine social networks is that the Jewish tribe is biologically foreign to Americans; to the degree Ashkenazis are intermarried to and assimilated among Whites they are correspondingly less “Jewish.” LGBTs, both the actual homosexuals as well as the fellow-travellers, are domestic; in fact the “LGBT movement” itself is overwhelming racially white and even the overrepresentation of Jews among their leadership and organizations corresponds to Jewish overrepresentation in American institutions generally.
Now, Dean’s “50 state strategy” makes sense: while the old Democratic party establishment wanted to write off states where Democrats weren’t likely to win, Dean’s team wanted to organize, and fundraise, in deep “red” areas. This mirrors the later official imperalist policy: to organize these semi-clandestine “LGBT networks” even “behind enemy lines.”
The Decline of Localism
Car culture encourages mobility, travel and even uprooting one’s family from their locality of birth and settling into another city or even state. The second most obvious technological development that spelled the death knell of American localism was mass electronic media, a development whose influence cannot be overstated.
Whatever social influence local institutions had were dwarfed in an instant by the mass electronic media. In the earliest days of electronic mass media the local broadcast stations were cartelized and controlled centrally. Even in the early days radio stations more often than not favored centralized programming of both news and entertainment instead of broadcasting the local community theater or orchestra. Especially by the time of television, the social influence of national news and nationally syndicated entertainment completely overpowered the influence of local community institutions and even the nuclear and extended family.
Mass electronic media advertising even broke localism at the family level; early radio ads would often target children, specifically, or a husband or a wife, specifically, instead of advertising to the whole family. This sort of “segmentation” of the market was itself a blow against the organic locality. Now, young Billy had more in common with his fellow schoolboy on the other side of the country than he did with his family, or an elder at his church, or a teacher at his school. Now, wife Jill was not “Mrs. John Smith” the Matriarch of the Smith Clan, but a member of the marketing segment “women.”
Howard Dean’s semi-clandestine “LGBT network,” just like the semi-clandestine “liberal Zionist” network in the Democratic party (Haim Saban) and the semi-clandestine “neo-conservative” network in the Republican party (Sheldon Adelson) has similarities with the old British Empire’s “Rhodes Scholarship” network that helped launch the career of former President Bill Clinton. In all of these cases, a “local” person becomes a leader, not due to support from the local community, but because they have been recruited by a larger network.
Dean’s main benefactors were not people from Vermont, nor even gays and lesbians in Vermont, but instead the nation-wide (perhaps even international) emerging “LGBT” tribe. A Jew like Bernie Sanders and a Goy like Lindsey Graham are not, fundamentally, representatives of the people of Vermont and South Carolina, but products of semi-clandestine Zionist fundraising, media and organizing networks. Bill Clinton did not win the Presidency based on his performance as Governor of Arkansas, but because his career was managed by the Anglo-American department of the old British Rhodes Scholarship network.
Even before the era of cheap, motorized transportation, and significantly before the invention of mass electronic media, such semi-clandestine networks existed in opposition to localism and, just like our present day, engendered a reaction, both localist and non-localist.
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