In an article published on the 80th anniversary of the start of World War Two, Paleocon legend Pat Buchanan attacks the rationale for that conflict at its weakest point, namely British interests viewed in hindsight.
All this really proves is that Buchanan is against the war as such, probably for pro-German and possibly even for anti-Jewish reasons, since, thanks to the Stakhanovite efforts of America's Jewophile media, the war is now lopsidedly viewed in the West as mainly a struggle to save the Jewish people, even though that was really only a minor element at the time.
Buchanan points out that British war goals, namely the freedom of Poland and to a lesser extent Czechoslovakia, were not realised (although they were realised in the sense that the Nazis didn't hang onto them very long). In what is only an 833-word article, Nixon's old speech writer uses ten rhetorical questions, including the article's title—Who Won, and Who Lost, World War II?—to hammer home his rather simplistic point:
Buchanan's barrage of rhetorical questions imply that Hitler was a completely fair-minded and trustworthy business partner who merely wanted the overwhelmingly German city of Danzig to be lovingly reunited with the Reich. The fact is, however, that Hitler was a serial treaty breaker who had sent his military into the Rhineland against existing treaties, forced Austria into a union using dubious methods, and then carved up Czechoslovakia, turning it into a German colony, despite yet more empty promises—and all this within the last few years in a desperate attempt to please the peanut gallery of whipped-up German national populism and cow potential opponents.
Chamberlain and Churchill's policy of finally standing up to Hitler was essential. To not have done so would have been nothing less than to abandon the whole of Europe, West of the Soviet Union to him, as the French, on their own, were too weak to stand against him. This would also have contravened the centuries-old central principle of British Foreign policy, namely to stop the continent being dominated by a single powerful state.
By Britain and France stiffening their line against Germany from 1938 onwards, it was hoped that the threat of Anglo-French military power in the West, combined with that of Soviet power in the East, would teach Hitler caution while empowering sensible and pragmatic elements within the German power system and military. There is much evidence to support this as a realistic policy.
Strengthening the guarantee to Poland was essential to this. The sad fact that Hitler was clearly too mad or stupid to take the hint does not mean that the policy was flawed. It means that Hitler was flawed and should never have been leading a nation as powerful and perfectly placed for Europe's destruction as Germany.
But the main problem with Buchanan's article is not its geopolitical triteness, but its ideological superficiality. The main theme of the article is the destruction that WWII caused to Britain and France's imperial systems:
The thing that really destroyed these empires was the ideological maelstrom that Hitler's war unleashed.
As both empires were Metropolitan European empires ruling relatively benignly over large non-White populations, they depended on de facto racial supremacism of a mild and nuanced sort. However both empires were "ideologically misaligned" from this de facto reality, as their moralities and ideologies were more of a messy Christian/ post-Christian morass of universal humanism, individualism, egalitarianism, and democracy. In those days the ideological underpinnings of racial realism were poorly developed and also extremely problematic in their application.
So how were these empires able to survive even before WWII with such a weak ideological base? As long as numerous ad hoc arrangements—filtered through the complexities of their diverse territories— combined with copious amounts of pragmatism could be applied, this ideological misalignment could be managed with relative success. The fact that these empires also brought enormous economic benefits to all their subjects should also not be discounted.
The reason World War II, however, turned out to be so damaging was not because of the shortcomings of the Maginot Line or a few Heinkel bombers over London, but because it forced these Empires to not only fight against the explicit, crude, and inhumane racial ideology of Naziism but to also take up ideological arms against their own much more humane and nuanced racial supremacism.
Indeed, the destruction of these empires by the advent of an explicit and unhinged version of their own de facto supremacist position is the perfect macrocosm to the microcosm of the Alt-Right's own destruction in recent years.
The attempt by the Old Alt-Right (2010-2015) to establish a nuanced, moral, and workable version of hierarchical values that accorded with observed realities, like inherent racial and sexual differences, was completely undermined by the comic book version of Neo-Naziism that was injected into the movement like a poison by obvious shills such as Weev and Anglin and useful idiots like Spencer, Enoch, and Johnson.
Civilisations die when, unable to synthesise opposing ideas into ever more complex and potent systems, they instead start de-synthesising them into increasingly polarised stupidities.
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All this really proves is that Buchanan is against the war as such, probably for pro-German and possibly even for anti-Jewish reasons, since, thanks to the Stakhanovite efforts of America's Jewophile media, the war is now lopsidedly viewed in the West as mainly a struggle to save the Jewish people, even though that was really only a minor element at the time.
Buchanan points out that British war goals, namely the freedom of Poland and to a lesser extent Czechoslovakia, were not realised (although they were realised in the sense that the Nazis didn't hang onto them very long). In what is only an 833-word article, Nixon's old speech writer uses ten rhetorical questions, including the article's title—Who Won, and Who Lost, World War II?—to hammer home his rather simplistic point:
On one level this critique is poignant, while on another it is clearly retarded. Yes, the war was instrumental in the contraction of British power, which also explains why Britain's war aims of saving Poland and Czechoslovakia from totalitarian imperialism failed, but it is also absurd to pretend that any country embarking on a complex global war can know the outcome beforehand.
- So, who really won, and who lost, the war?
- Yet if both nations ended up under Bolshevik rule for half a century, did Britain win their freedom?
- Why did Britain declare war for a cause and country it could not defend?
- What vital British interest was imperiled by Hitler’s retrieval of a port city, Danzig, that had been severed from Germany against the will of its 300,000 people and handed to Poland at Versailles in 1919?
- Why then did Britain declare war?
- But at war’s end, what was the balance sheet of Churchill?
Buchanan's barrage of rhetorical questions imply that Hitler was a completely fair-minded and trustworthy business partner who merely wanted the overwhelmingly German city of Danzig to be lovingly reunited with the Reich. The fact is, however, that Hitler was a serial treaty breaker who had sent his military into the Rhineland against existing treaties, forced Austria into a union using dubious methods, and then carved up Czechoslovakia, turning it into a German colony, despite yet more empty promises—and all this within the last few years in a desperate attempt to please the peanut gallery of whipped-up German national populism and cow potential opponents.
Chamberlain and Churchill's policy of finally standing up to Hitler was essential. To not have done so would have been nothing less than to abandon the whole of Europe, West of the Soviet Union to him, as the French, on their own, were too weak to stand against him. This would also have contravened the centuries-old central principle of British Foreign policy, namely to stop the continent being dominated by a single powerful state.
By Britain and France stiffening their line against Germany from 1938 onwards, it was hoped that the threat of Anglo-French military power in the West, combined with that of Soviet power in the East, would teach Hitler caution while empowering sensible and pragmatic elements within the German power system and military. There is much evidence to support this as a realistic policy.
Strengthening the guarantee to Poland was essential to this. The sad fact that Hitler was clearly too mad or stupid to take the hint does not mean that the policy was flawed. It means that Hitler was flawed and should never have been leading a nation as powerful and perfectly placed for Europe's destruction as Germany.
But the main problem with Buchanan's article is not its geopolitical triteness, but its ideological superficiality. The main theme of the article is the destruction that WWII caused to Britain and France's imperial systems:
Britain would end the war bombed, bled and bankrupt, with her empire in Asia, India, the Mideast and Africa disintegrating. In two decades it would all be gone.It seems here that Buchanan is naively putting forward the thesis that these empires collapsed due to military setbacks. Indeed there is nothing else in the article to suggest otherwise. But the fact is the British Empire was among the military victors and quickly recovered the relatively minor territories it lost in the East—Malaya, Burma, and Hong Kong—while France too fell on its feet with the post-war re-establishment of its Empire. Compare this to the vast fluctuations in territory that were common to empires in the past, which nonetheless managed to revivify themselves.
France would end the war after living under Nazi occupation and Vichy rule for five years, lose her African and Asian empire and then sustain defeats and humiliation in Indochina in 1954 and Algeria in 1962.
The thing that really destroyed these empires was the ideological maelstrom that Hitler's war unleashed.
As both empires were Metropolitan European empires ruling relatively benignly over large non-White populations, they depended on de facto racial supremacism of a mild and nuanced sort. However both empires were "ideologically misaligned" from this de facto reality, as their moralities and ideologies were more of a messy Christian/ post-Christian morass of universal humanism, individualism, egalitarianism, and democracy. In those days the ideological underpinnings of racial realism were poorly developed and also extremely problematic in their application.
So how were these empires able to survive even before WWII with such a weak ideological base? As long as numerous ad hoc arrangements—filtered through the complexities of their diverse territories— combined with copious amounts of pragmatism could be applied, this ideological misalignment could be managed with relative success. The fact that these empires also brought enormous economic benefits to all their subjects should also not be discounted.
The reason World War II, however, turned out to be so damaging was not because of the shortcomings of the Maginot Line or a few Heinkel bombers over London, but because it forced these Empires to not only fight against the explicit, crude, and inhumane racial ideology of Naziism but to also take up ideological arms against their own much more humane and nuanced racial supremacism.
Indeed, the destruction of these empires by the advent of an explicit and unhinged version of their own de facto supremacist position is the perfect macrocosm to the microcosm of the Alt-Right's own destruction in recent years.
The attempt by the Old Alt-Right (2010-2015) to establish a nuanced, moral, and workable version of hierarchical values that accorded with observed realities, like inherent racial and sexual differences, was completely undermined by the comic book version of Neo-Naziism that was injected into the movement like a poison by obvious shills such as Weev and Anglin and useful idiots like Spencer, Enoch, and Johnson.
Civilisations die when, unable to synthesise opposing ideas into ever more complex and potent systems, they instead start de-synthesising them into increasingly polarised stupidities.
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